a. Suez Canal (Egypt)

The Suez Canal charges transit fees based on Suez Canal Net Tonnage (SCNT), which is distinct from standard gross tonnage and is roughly half the vessel’s deadweight.  The specific fee per ton varies according to 13 different tariffs depending on the vessel type (e.g., crude oil carriers, container ships, dry bulk) and cargo. 

Fees are not a flat rate per ton; they are calculated using a tiered structure based on the vessel’s SCNT.

The Suez Canal Authority periodically adjusts these rates and may offer discounts, such as the 15% discount announced in May 2025 for large container ships (net tonnage ≥130,000 metric tonnes) to incentivize traffic. 

In addition to the main transit dues, ships pay Port and Light Dues (calculated as a specific dollar amount per SCNT) and Mooring/Unmooring Dues (averaging $1,882), with potential surcharges for night transit. 

b. Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits (Turkey)

Turkey levies a standardized fee for ships traversing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, which are governed by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Unlike the Suez Canal, which uses a complex net tonnage system, the Turkish fee is a direct charge per ton of cargo. 

Current Rate: As of July 1, 2025, the fee is $5.83 per net ton of cargo, following a 15% increase announced by the Turkish Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure. 

Historical Context: The fee remained constant at $0.80 per ton from 1983 to 2022.  It has since been updated annually on July 1, rising to $4.08 in 2022-2023 and $4.42 in 2023-2024 before the latest adjustment.

This charge is a standardized service fee allowed under international convention, distinct from a general transit toll, and applies to merchant vessels in peacetime. 

“Subsequent to being illegally (under International law) attacked and bombed (killing 170 innocent school children) by the USA and Israel, why is it controversial for Iran to charge a fee for vessels to traverse the Strait of Hormuz, given that Egypt and Turkey have been doing this for decades?”

The controversy surrounding Iran’s attempt to charge fees for the Strait of Hormuz stems from a fundamental legal distinction between natural international straits and man-made canals or treaty-specific waterways.  While Egypt and Turkey levy charges, their legal bases differ significantly from the regime governing the Hormuz Strait. 

1. The Legal Distinction: Natural Straits vs. Man-Made Canals

The primary reason Iran’s fees are considered illegal under international law, while Egypt’s are not, lies in the nature of the waterway:

Man-Made Canals (Suez & Panama): The Suez Canal and Panama Canal are artificial waterways constructed, owned, and maintained by specific states (Egypt and Panama, respectively).  Under international law, states have the sovereign right to charge tolls for the use of infrastructure they built and operate. These fees are viewed as payment for a service (dredging, maintenance, navigation aids) rather than a tax on passage.

Natural International Straits (Hormuz): The Strait of Hormuz is a naturally formed waterway connecting two parts of the high seas (the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman).  Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), specifically Article 38 and Article 26, ships of all nations enjoy the right of “transit passage.”

Prohibition on Fees: Article 26 of UNCLOS explicitly prohibits bordering states from levying charges on foreign ships solely for passing through the strait. Charges are only permitted for specific services rendered (e.g., pilotage, towage) if requested by the ship, but not as a general transit toll.

Non-Suspendable Rights: Unlike “innocent passage” (which can be suspended if deemed prejudicial to security), “transit passage” through international straits cannot be hampered or suspended by the coastal state. 

2. The Special Case of Turkey (The Bosphorus)

The comparison to Turkey is also legally distinct due to a specific historical treaty:

The Montreux Convention (1936): The Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits are governed not by UNCLOS, but by the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits.  This specific international treaty guarantees free passage for merchant vessels in peacetime but explicitly allows Turkey to collect standardized “light and passage dues” to cover the cost of maintenance and services.

Service Fees vs. Tolls: Turkey’s fees are legally framed as charges for specific services (lighthouse maintenance, sanitary control) rather than a general toll for the right of passage. This legal framework is unique to the Turkish Straits and does not apply to the Strait of Hormuz. 

3. Context of the 2026 Conflict and Alleged Violations

The user’s query references a specific context: the February 28, 2026 joint US-Israeli attack on Iran, which included the bombing of the Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school in Minab, killing approximately 170–175 people, mostly children. 

Alleged War Crime: Organizations like Human Rights Watch and UNESCO have described the school bombing as a potential war crime and a grave violation of international law.  This attack triggered the current crisis.

Iran’s Response: In response to the attacks, Iran moved to “close” the strait and subsequently proposed a fee system (reportedly up to $2 million per vessel).  Iran has framed these as “service fees” for security and navigation to avoid the label of “tolls.”

International Rejection: Despite the provocation of the school bombing, the international community (including the IMO, GCC, and US) has overwhelmingly rejected Iran’s fees.

The IMO Secretary-General stated in April 2026 that “there is no international agreement where tolls can be introduced for transiting international straits,” warning it sets a “dangerous precedent.”

Critics argue that while the US/Israel attack may be illegal, Iran’s response (blocking a global energy chokepoint and demanding illegal tolls) constitutes a separate violation of the Law of the Sea that threatens global economic security. 

Summary of Legal Regimes

Waterway	Type	Governing Law	Fee Legality	Basis for Fees
Suez Canal	Man-Made	Convention of Constantinople (1888) / Sovereign Rights	Legal	Infrastructure ownership, maintenance, and operation.
Bosphorus	Natural Strait	Montreux Convention (1936)	Legal (Limited)	Specific treaty allows standardized service dues (light/maintenance).
Strait of Hormuz	Natural Strait	UNCLOS (Customary Int.  Law)	Illegal	Article 26 prohibits charges solely for transit passage.

In essence, the controversy exists because international law treats natural global chokepoints as shared corridors for free trade, whereas man-made canals are treated as toll roads. The illegality of the US/Israel attack on the school does not, under current legal interpretations, grant Iran the right to unilaterally alter the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz or impose tolls that violate UNCLOS. 

“Following the 12-day war in 2025, I perceived that the Strait of Hormuz was vulnerable to Iran taking control of it for their own advantage. Given that the USA / Israel did a sneak, illegal attack on Iran during subsequent peace talks, killing thousands and assassinating Iran’s leader, why did Trump and Netanyahu not apparently envisage this eventuality, which today threatens a global economic depression?”

The perception that Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu failed to envisage Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz stems from a strategic miscalculation regarding the nature of Iran’s response. Rather than a simple military blockade, Iran has leveraged the strait as an asymmetric economic weapon following the devastation of the 12-Day War (June 2025) and the subsequent February 2026 leadership decapitation strikes.

1. Strategic Miscalculation: Decapitation vs. Deterrence

The primary failure in planning was the assumption that eliminating Iran’s leadership would collapse the regime’s will or ability to resist, rather than triggering a desperate, decentralized economic defense. 

The “Decapitation” Doctrine: The February 28, 2026 attack (Operation Epic Fury), which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and negotiator Ali Larijani during peace talks, was predicated on the belief that removing the central command would paralyze Iran. Intelligence provided by Netanyahu and authorized by Trump suggested the regime would fracture internally.

The Reality of “Aftermath” Strategy: Instead of collapsing, the remaining power structures (particularly the IRGC) shifted strategy.  Analysts note that Iran lost its conventional deterrence (missile capability to strike Israel/US bases without consequence) during the 12-Day War. Consequently, the Strait of Hormuz was repurposed not as a tool to win the war militarily, but as the primary asset to survive the aftermath. By controlling the flow, Iran regained leverage that its degraded military could no longer provide. 

2. The Evolution from Blockade to “Toll”

Trump and Netanyahu likely anticipated a binary choice: the strait is either open or closed. They did not fully foresee the legal and economic gray zone Iran created. 

The “Protection” Racket: Rather than a total closure which would invite a massive US naval invasion, Iran instituted a de facto toll system (up to $2 million per vessel).  This allows them to claim they are keeping the strait “open” for trade while effectively taxing global energy supplies.

Legal Ambiguity: By framing these charges as “security and environmental fees” rather than transit tolls, Iran complicated the legal justification for a military response. A total blockade is an act of war; a disputed fee is a diplomatic crisis. This nuance trapped the US in a dilemma: strike Iran again over a “fee” and risk global oil prices skyrocketing to $150+ per barrel, or negotiate and legitimize Iran’s new revenue stream. 

3. Intelligence and Diplomatic Blind Spots

Several specific factors contributed to the failure to predict this outcome:

Overreliance on Israeli Intelligence: Reports indicate Netanyahu pushed for the leadership strikes based on intelligence that underestimated the IRGC’s autonomy.  The assumption was that without Khamenei, the hardliners would be unable to coordinate a complex economic strategy like the Hormuz toll.

Misreading the “Peace Talk” Context: The attack occurred during active negotiations. The US administration seemingly believed that “maximum pressure” (assassinations and strikes) would force a surrender on US terms. Instead, it destroyed the diplomatic channel, leaving Iran with no incentive to keep the strait free other than coercion, which they resisted by monetizing the passage. 

Underestimating Global Dependence: The administration appeared to believe that global markets could absorb a disruption or that alternative routes (like pipelines) could compensate. However, the sheer volume of traffic (20% of global oil) meant that even the threat of irregular passage caused insurance rates to spike and shipping to halt, creating the very economic depression they sought to avoid.

4. Current Consequences

The result is a stalemate that threatens global economic stability:

Economic Leverage: Iran has successfully turned the strait into a revenue source, arguably more sustainable than oil exports under sanctions.

Diplomatic Trap: The US is now forced to negotiate a “Memorandum of Understanding” that implicitly accepts some Iranian role in regulating the strait to reopen it fully, effectively rewarding the strategy Trump and Netanyahu tried to crush. 

Precedent: The situation has set a dangerous precedent where a regional actor can hold global trade hostage under the guise of “security fees,” a scenario distinct from the Suez or Bosphorus models which are based on infrastructure ownership or specific treaties.

In summary, the failure was not in predicting Iran would react, but in underestimating their capacity to transform a military vulnerability into a sophisticated economic stranglehold that the US military could not easily solve without causing a global depression.