Wirral In It Together

Return to Bomb Alley 1982 – The Falklands Deception, by Paul Cardin

Amazon link

http://paulcardin.substack.com

Return to Bomb Alley 1982 – The Falklands Deception, by Paul Cardin

Amazon link

http://paulcardin.substack.com

Return to Bomb Alley 1982 – The Falklands Deception, by Paul Cardin

Amazon link

http://paulcardin.substack.com

Return to Bomb Alley 1982 – The Falklands Deception, by Paul Cardin

Amazon link

http://paulcardin.substack.com

INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS REPORT
Operation Talla, NPCC Chiefs’ Council Minutes (12 January 2022) and CRN 6029679/21

Executive Summary
This report provides a detailed forensic analysis of the
NPCC Chiefs’ Council Minutes dated 12 January 2022
(created 14 January 2022) and identifies their evidential
significance in relation to the Metropolitan Police Service
Crime Reference Number 6029679/21, the operational
structure and conduct of Operation Talla, the emergence
of the “to not record” approach and the Speirs Directive
issued on 25 January 2022.
The document constitutes direct evidence of nationallevel policing coordination at the highest operational tier.
It demonstrates that a single crime report made to the
Metropolitan Police Service was escalated beyond local
handling and became the subject of national strategic
consideration across all Chief Constables.
That report was subjected to centralised assessment, the
outcome of which was intended to produce a “clearer
steer” capable of being communicated to all police forces
nationally.
The same material was also passed to a government anticovid misinformation group, thereby introducing nonpolicing actors into the handling pathway of what was, in
form, a criminal allegation.
The matter was further recorded as requiring peer review
and dissemination across all forces.
When placed within the established evidential timeline,
the document provides compelling linkage evidence that
Crime Reference Number 6029679/21 functioned as a
national trigger event in the formulation of Operation Talla
response policy, including the subsequent adoption of
non-recording practices and rejection protocols.

Source Document
The source document is the NPCC Chiefs’ Council
Minutes for 12 January 2022, bearing the security
classification “OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE.”

Verbatim Extracts Relevant to Operation Talla and
CRN Context
The following passages are extracted verbatim and form
the evidential core of this analysis.
The first passage states:
“Most forces received a letter from an anti-vax group
before Christmas. A crime report was made to the Met and
the final assessment should be complete next week when
a clearer steer can be communicated. Some forces have
been asked for an update on actions they are taking by a
variety of people, and it looks as if some groups are
connecting to promote their agenda. This is all being
passed to the government anti covid misinformation group
so themes can be identified and options explored.”
The second passage states:
“Op Talla team to share the results of the peer review
assessment relating to the Crime Report submitted to the
Met Police in relation to Anti-Vaccinations with all chiefs.”

Forensic Contextualisation
The minutes refer to “a crime report… made to the Met.”
This reference must be analysed in light of the known
evidential framework surrounding Crime Reference
Number 6029679/21. That crime report was submitted to
the Metropolitan Police Service in December 2021,
allocated a formal crime reference number and
subsequently subject to internal handling processes,
including recategorisation and internal communications
which has been properly evidenced.
The language used within the minutes demonstrates that
the crime report in question was not treated as a localised
or routine complaint. Instead, it was elevated to national
awareness, subjected to structured assessment and
positioned as the basis for a coordinated response across
all forces. The phrase “a clearer steer can be
communicated” is of particular operational significance. It
indicates that a national directive was in development,
derived from the assessment of a single report and
intended for dissemination across all policing bodies.
This transforms the character of the report from an
evidential submission requiring investigation into a policygenerating event within a national command environment.

National Elevation of CRN 6029679/21
The meeting at which this discussion occurred included
all Chief Constables across the United Kingdom, senior
Metropolitan Police leadership and national operational
leads, including Assistant Chief Constable Owen
Weatherill of the National Police Coordination Centre.
The inclusion of such personnel confirms that the subject
matter of the crime report had been elevated to the
highest level of policing governance.
The progression evident within the minutes is clear and
sequential.
A crime report is submitted. That report becomes known
nationally.
It is subjected to centralised assessment.
A national “steer” is anticipated.
The outcome is to be disseminated across all forces.
This progression is not consistent with ordinary
investigative handling.
It is consistent with the derivation of policy from a criminal
allegation.

External Influence and Government Involvement
The document expressly states that the material arising
from the report is being passed to “the government anti
covid misinformation group.”
This introduces a significant constitutional and legal
dimension.
The handling of a crime report is no longer confined to
policing structures or evidential assessment processes.
Instead, it is integrated into a governmental framework
concerned with messaging, behavioural analysis and
narrative control.
The functional effect of this is to alter the categorisation of
the underlying material.
A report which begins as an allegation of criminal conduct
is repositioned within a framework concerned with
“misinformation” and thematic analysis.
This constitutes a recharacterisation of evidential material
and is directly relevant to subsequent non-recording and
rejection practices.

The “Steer” as a Precursor to Non-Recording
Practices
The reference to a forthcoming “steer” must be read in
conjunction with subsequent NPCC disclosures referring
to “the guidance to not record” and the Speirs Directive
issued on 25 January 2022.
The temporal proximity is critical. The meeting took place
on 12 January 2022. The Speirs Directive followed thirteen
days later. Within that interval, the assessment of the
crime report was to be completed and a “steer”
communicated.
This sequence establishes a logical continuity. A
nationally significant report is assessed. A coordinated
response is formulated. A directive emerges shortly
thereafter.
The evidential weight of this sequence supports the
inference that the “steer” referenced in the minutes is
functionally connected to the subsequent adoption of
non-recording practices.

Linkage to the Speirs Directive
The Speirs Directive instructed Police Scotland to reject
COVID-19 vaccine-related reports and explicitly stated
that it was issued on the advice of the National Police
Chiefs’ Council and UK Gold Command under Operation
Talla.
The structural alignment between the minutes and the
Directive is clear.
The minutes demonstrate that the NPCC and Operation
Talla structures were actively engaged in centralised
decision-making and the generation of national guidance.
The functional alignment is equally clear. Both the
minutes and the Directive address vaccine-related
reporting, operate at a national coordination level and
result in uniform handling across forces.
Accordingly, the minutes provide pre-decisional evidence
of the policy environment from which the Speirs Directive
emerged.

Linkage to the “to not record” Approach
NPCC disclosures confirm that “the guidance to not
record has been a success.”
The minutes provide the contextual bridge necessary to
understand how such guidance emerged.
They demonstrate that policing leadership was centrally
concerned with the volume and coordination of reports,
that there was an intention to identify themes across
forces and that a national “steer” was to be issued. The
involvement of the government misinformation group
further indicates a reframing of the reports themselves.
The progression is therefore coherent and evidentially
supported.
Reports are received at scale. They are centrally assessed.
They are reframed within a misinformation context. A
national directive is formulated. Non-recording and
rejection practices are adopted.
The document therefore evidences the decision-making
phase immediately preceding the systematic nonrecording of relevant allegations.

Operation Talla as a Command Structure
The minutes demonstrate that Operation Talla operated
through the NPCC Chiefs’ Council and involved all UK
forces. It produced coordinated updates, national actions
and structured dissemination pathways.
It also engaged with external partners and government
bodies.
These features are characteristic of a command structure
rather than a purely informational or advisory framework.
The presence of centralised updates, coordinated
logistics, formal action tracking and national
dissemination confirms that Operation Talla functioned as
a de facto national command mechanism.

Overall Forensic Conclusions
The evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the
crime report associated with CRN 6029679/21 was
escalated nationally, treated as strategically significant
and used to inform national policy development.
The document demonstrates that Operation Talla
operated as a centralised coordination and decisionmaking structure with the capacity to generate national
guidance and integrate with government systems.
There is a clear evidential pathway linking the crime report
to the emergence of non-recording practices.
The minutes capture the stage at which the report was
being assessed and a national “steer” was being
formulated.
Within days, this is followed by the Speirs Directive and
the broader adoption of rejection and non-recording
policies.
The document therefore provides precursor evidence of
the decision-making environment which gave rise to those
policies.

Final Evidential Position
On a balanced and rigorous forensic assessment, the
contents of these minutes materially support the
conclusion that a nationally significant crime report,
namely CRN 6029679/21, was escalated through
Operation Talla structures, subjected to centralised
assessment involving both policing and government
actors and used as a basis for developing nationally
coordinated guidance which, within a short and proximate
timeframe, manifested as the Speirs Directive and the
broader “to not record” operational approach.
Ian Clayton
6 April 2026
Note: A copy of the relevant meeting minutes may be
examined below.
1
Back to Agenda
Security Classification
NPCC Policy: Documents cannot be accepted or ratified without a security classification (Protective Marking may
assist in assessing whether exemptions to FOIA may apply):
OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
Freedom of information
(FOI)
This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer &
Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. For external Public Authorities in
receipt of an FOI, please consult with npcc.foi.request@npfdu.pollice.uk
Author and Contributors: Mark Farey
Force/Organisation: NPCC
Date Created: 14 January 2022
Coordination Committee: NPCC Central Office
Portfolio: N/A
Attachments @ para N/A
Information Governance &
Security
In compliance with the Government’s Security Policy Framework’s (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any
onsite printing is supervised, and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or
further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in compliance with other security controls and
legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact npcc.foi.request@npfdu.pollice.uk
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-securitypolicy-framework#risk-management
Chief Constables’ Council Minutes
12 January 2022
Attendees
CC Michelle Skeer Cumbria – Meeting Chair
T/DCC Nikki Watson Avon and Somerset
CC Garry Forsyth Bedfordshire
CC Nick Dean Cambridgeshire
CC Mark Roberts Cheshire
2
Cmsr Angela McLaren City of London
DCC Helen McMillan Cleveland
CC Rachel Swann Derbyshire Constabulary
CC Shaun Sawyer Devon and Cornwall
CC Jo Farrell Durham
CC Richard Lewis Dyfed
-Powys
CC Ben
-Julian Harrington Essex
CC Rod Hansen Gloucestershire
CC Stephen Watson Greater Manchester
CC Pam Kelly Gwent
CC Olivia Pinkney Hampshire
CC Charlie Hall Hertfordshire
CC Lee Freeman Humberside
CC Chris Rowley Lancashire
CC Simon Cole Leicestershire
T/ACC Chris Davison Lincolnshire
CC Serena Kennedy Merseyside
Dep Cmsr Sir Stephen House Metropolitan Police Service
AC Helen Ball Metropolitan Police Service
DAC Amanda Pearson Metropolitan Police Service
AC Louisa Rolfe Metropolitan Police Service
AC Matt Jukes Metropolitan Police Service
CC Andy Adams Ministry of Defence Police
CC Carl Foulkes North Wales
CC Paul Sanford Norfolk Constabulary
DCC Simon Nickless Northamptonshire
CC Craig Guildford Nottinghamshire
CC Winton Keenan Northumbria
DCC Mabs Hussain North Yorkshire
CC Iain Livingstone Police Scotland
CC James Vaughan South Wales
T/CC Lauren Poultney South Yorkshire
CC Chris Noble Staffordshire
CC Stephen Jupp Suffolk
CC Gavin Stephens Surrey
CC Jo Shiner Sussex
CC Debra Tedds Warwickshire
CC Pippa Mills West Mercia
CC Sir David Thompson West Midlands
CC John Robins West Yorkshire
CC Kier Pritchard Wiltshire
DCC Alistair Sutherland British Transport Police
3
CC Simon Chesterman Civil Nuclear Constabulary
CEO Andy Marsh College of Policing
S23 S23
Col Mark John Royal Military Police
CO Ruari Hardy Guernsey Police
CO Robin Smith States of Jersey Police
A/DCC Stewart Gull States of Jersey Police
CO Gary Roberts Isle of Man Police
Cmsr Richard Ullger Royal Gibraltar Police
In attendance
ACC Owen Weatherill NPoCC
AC Robert Beckley Assistant Commissioner – Op Resolve
DCC Janette McCormick Operation Uplift
Robin Wilkinson Metropolitan Police Service
Gemma Stannard NPCC Strategic Hub Lead
Angela Connolly NPCC Business Support Lead
T/Ch Insp Wayne Nash NPCC Staff Officer
Richard Hampson NPCC Senior Business Officer
Cathy Willis NPCC Executive Assistant
Mark Farey NPCC Business Support
David Paul NPCC Workforce Committee Support
John Bragaglia NPCC SOC Portfolio Director/National ROCU Coordinator
Fi Greenlees NPCC FOIA
S23 S23CO
S23 S23Director
S23 S23 SRO
S23 S23
Nicola Growcott NPCC Head of Communications
SESSION 1:
NPCC Chair’s Update
The Chair welcomed those presentto this virtual Chiefs’ Council meeting. The following tendered their
apologies for the meeting.
AC Martin Hewitt – NPCC Chair
Chief Constable Nick Adderley – Northamptonshire Police
Chief Constable Sarah Crew – Avon and Somerset Constabulary
Chief Constable Alan Pughsley – Kent Police
4
Op Talla Covid-19 Update
The latest absence rate is 8.6% which has decreased from previous week rate of 9.5% which is first
fall in a month. There is disparity in absence rates across the county with 18 forces still over 10% but
while this is uncomfortable none are reporting a critical issue at this stage.
There is still an issue with LFT supply and Dr Jenny Harries has written to all LAs and LRF chairs
reminding them to share available existing stocks with emergency services. An additional 12,000
LFTs will be distributed to forces and targeted at Control Rooms with rationale being to avoid the
difficulty of having to backfill that function. This will provide 5 weeks supply for each staff member.
The distribution to forces will be based on numbers returned recently, and it is expected to take
place week commencing 17 January.
There is no change on testing regulations at present.
The second tranche of the Disproportionality Report for Fixed Penalty Notices has now been
completed. The University of Edinburgh will distribute this to forces next week for quality assurance,
after this it will need to be peer reviewed. As there is not a clamour for the report at present there
will probably not be publication until the third tranche is completed. This should be much faster
than previous tranches and then reporting will cover the period to summer of 2020 which is where
the bulk of enforcement took place. This would give a fuller picture of the enforcement activity
rather than just releasing the report on the second tranche.
Most forces received a letter from an anti-vax group before Christmas. A crime report was made to
the Met and the final assessment should be complete next week when a clearer steer can be
communicated. Some forces have been asked for an update on actions they are taking by a variety
of people, and it looks as if some groups are connecting to promote their agenda. This is all being
passed to the government anti covid misinformation group so themes can be identified and options
explored. To help with this a request for information was sent by AMA group to all forces and
responses would be appreciated.
Homicide Prevention and Beating Crime Plan
Recent meeting with the Policing Minister focused more on Homicide Prevention than the Beating
Crime Plan. The Minister has a strong interest in how police can use data to predict where
homicides are likely to take place. While this focus is welcome the need to work with other partner
agencies must also be highlighted. Data should be collected on what is required from partners in
order to have better outcomes – e.g. education, housing etc.
A national homicide suppression strategy needs to be developed along with partner agencies. Data
such as markers for knife crime and data from child services should be used to identify those at risk.
For example recent data on teen murder and exclusion from school shows that 60% had been
excluded from school. Up to 85% of young people murdered are BAME and in conjunction with
other high risk indicators (50% had previous CJS contact) a cohort of young men can be identified,
5
the most appropriate interventions should be identified – whether this be police focus or other
partner agencies taking lead.
Concerns about Domestic abuse act were also raised – levels of domestic homicide have not
decreased in line with other types. There is a need to be very clear about evidence and data and
how it may be used as a predictor for crimes. Greatest opportunities are with education, housing
and health for reduction and prevention of crime rather than with the police.
Ten forces are to build a small hub with CoP access. This would collect data and look at perpetrator
and victim profiles. This will help to identify which interactions with other agencies would be best to
focus on. Noted that not all areas can have the same models, what works for Thames Valley may
not be the best sustainable option for London or West Midlands.
Op Talla – Covid-19 Update
1.1 Decision: Chiefs noted the update
1.2 Action: Op Talla team to share the work created in conjunction with Edinburgh University around
disproportionately of fixed penalty notices to chiefs for quality assurance.
1.3 Action: Op Talla team to share the results of the peer review assessment relating to the Crime
Report submitted to the Met Police in relation to Anti-Vaccinations with allchiefs.
Homicide Prevention and Beating Crime Plan Update
1.4 Decision: Chiefs noted the update.
1.5 Action: Homicide prevention to be included in the agenda during crime session at FebruaryCCC.
1.6 Action: Beating crime plan following the systems leaders meeting to be included in the agenda
during the Performance Management session at the March CCC. The Policing Minister will be invited
to attend the March meeting to discuss.
SESSION 2:
NPCC Pay and Conditions Update
S31
SESSION 3:
Inclusion and Race Programme
Reminder that full and frank discussions are best supported if Chatham House rules are observed.
Draft of introduction to plan has been circulated and it is acknowledged that this a difficult
discussion and there are a range of opinions over the most appropriate language to use, although all
6
agree that it is important that actions are seen to be taken. It may be difficult to build consensus
across policing and different communities on the best phrasing to use, however a consistent position
should be agreed as this is an issue which needs to be addressed.
The label of Institutional Racism could be seen as unhelpful and there are concerns as to what the
media reaction and impact on staff morale would be. It is recognised that Chiefs Constables are not
a diverse group and it was decided to bring Black voices in to hear from those with lived experience,
and they do believe police are institutionally racist.
It was suggested that it may be worth investigating how other public sector organisations, such as
NHS, have defined issues along with the wider societal and historical context. The actions already
taken and progress made should be highlighted in the plan.
Inclusion and Race Programme Plan Discussion
3.1 Decisions: Chiefs agreed to provide feedback and proposed alternative wording to the proposed
foreword (statement) within ten days, for incorporation into the revised plan in time for the
February Chiefs’ Council meeting.
3.2 Action: NPCC Comms to provide a form of words following the outcome of the Race & inclusion
discussion.
SESSION 4:
S23,
SESSION 5:
SOC PUP Uplift and Forward Plan
S31 & S24
5.1 Decision: Chiefs’ endorsed the proposals and direction of travel set out in the paperincluding:

NPCC SOC Portfolio will commence work with NPCC Portfolio leads, regional SOC Chief
Officer leads and partners on the 23/24 allocation, as soon as the full funding settlement is
known.

S23

Aim to complete the document before the end of the financial year, subject to confirmation
of funding settlements. S23 Document will be
7
signed off by NPCC SOC Programme Board and National Crime Coordination Committee,
before being submitted to the Home Office.

When agreed, implementation will be overseen by National ROCU Executive Board,
comprising regional SOC Chief Officer leads and partners.

Return to Bomb Alley 1982 – The Falklands Deception, by Paul Cardin

Amazon link

http://paulcardin.substack.com

Trump is lying once again. Iran will continue to defend themselves … and they are NOT, repeat NOT breaching any agreed ceasefire because … THERE ISN’T ONE. How can there be when the US / Israel resort to sneak, terrorist attacks during negotiations? Thanks.

https://youtube.com/live/t6jHFTjTRAA?si=GKz9nk3iuMRbbNjI

Return to Bomb Alley 1982 – The Falklands Deception, by Paul Cardin

Amazon link

http://paulcardin.substack.com

https://youtube.com/shorts/r4OYZqpEO-g?si=EvnHAyj4EV_7Ttq_

https://archive.org/details/soylentgreen_201907

People are energy.

Anagram of Soylent Green = STOLEN ENERGY

AI spoiler!

“People are energy. In this film, their energy was stolen to create food. Ironic, given the anagram?”

The phrase “Soylent Green is people” refers to the film’s shocking revelation that the food product Soylent Green is made from human remains, not plankton as advertised.

While “Soylent Green” is indeed an anagram of “Stolen Energy,” this is coincidental and not the reason for the name. The term “Soylent” originates from soy and lentils, reflecting the plant-based ingredients in the original novel Make Room! Make Room! by Harry Harrison. The film adaptation introduced the dystopian twist of human-based production to heighten its critique of overpopulation, corporate deception, and environmental collapse.

The idea of “stolen energy” can be interpreted symbolically—the lives of the poor and deceased are literally harvested and repurposed without consent, representing a grotesque exploitation of human bodies for systemic survival. So while the anagram isn’t intentional, it resonates ironically with the film’s themes of consumption, loss, and dehumanization.

Return to Bomb Alley 1982 – The Falklands Deception, by Paul Cardin

Amazon link

http://paulcardin.substack.com